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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STATE TAXATION-PRIVATELY HELD LEASEHOLDS IN PUBLICLY
OWNED LAND--Ch. 187, [1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess.
In April 1973 the Washington State Legislature enacted the-Lease-
hold Exemption Act,' providing special tax treatment for certain
leasehold interests in publicly owned, tax-exempt land. This measure
was a response to the 1970 Washington Supreme Court decision
which held that, in valuing these leasehold interests for ad valorem
property tax purposes, the same standards of assessment were to be
utilized as were used for valuing taxable property in general. The Leg-
islature chose to apply the court's 1970 decision prospectively only. In
so doing, it has placed serious strains on the assessment process. This
note will discuss these administrative problems, as well as constitu-
tional and equitable concerns raised by the Act.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Washington, until 1970, leasehold interests 2 were valued for
property tax purposes according to a set of standards developed from
four early court decisions commonly referred to as the Metropolitan
Building Company cases. 3 These standards, which received tacit ap-
proval from the court as recently as 1967, 4 provided that in deter-
mining the taxable value of leasehold interests, rents reserved (i.e.,
rents remaining to be paid over the term of the lease) and mortgage
1. Ch. 187, [1973] Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. [hereinafter referred to as ch. 187
or the Act]. Section 1 of the Act is codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 84.40.030;
§§ 2-10 are codified in WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.29.010-.90; § I 1 is codified in WASH.
REV. CODE. § 84.36.450; § 12 is not codified; § 13 is noted in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.29.010; and §§ 14-15 are codified in WASH. REV. CODE §§ 84.36.455-.460 (Supp.
1973).
2. The term "leasehold interests" is used to distinguish the interest of a lessee in
government-owned property from the interest of a lessee in privately owned land.
See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY AND
HANDBOOK (5th ed. 1967).
3. Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 62 Wash. 409, 113 P. 1114 (1911);
Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 64 Wash. 615, 117 P. 495 (1911); Metropolitan
Bldg. Co. v. King County, 72 Wash. 47, 129 P. 883 (1913); In re Metropolitan Bldg.
Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 P. 473 (1927).
4. Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 71 Wn. 2d 92, 426 P.2d 610 (1967). This case was
the forerunner of the 1970 decision. In the 1967 decision, the court held that the
county assessor did not have the option to value plaintiff's property as a leasehold for
a term less than the life of the holder or as improvements upon publicly-owned lands;
he must consider the former.
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indebtedness were to be deducted from the fair market value of the
leasehold. In 1970, however, the court overturned 60 years of preced-
ent, holding in Pier 67, Inc. v. King County5 that the county assessor,
in valuing a privately held lease of publicly owned, tax-exempt land, is
required to determine the fair market value of the right to use the
property over the period of the lease without deduction for rents re-
served or mortgage indebtedness.
The plaintiff in Pier 67 questioned the value which the county as-
sessor had placed upon land leased from the State of Washington on
which plaintiff had built the motor hotel commonly known as the
Edgewater Inn.6 The trial court, following the Washington Supreme
Court's 1967 decision, 7 valued plaintiffs leasehold interest at zero
because the hotel's net earnings in taxable years were exceeded by the
total of the rent and mortgage payments due.8 The county appealed.
In revising this method of valuation, the Washington court declared
that "the standards of valuation for assessing leaseholds are the same
standards for valuing and assessing taxable property in general." 9 The
court concluded that the interpretation in the Metropolitan Building
Company cases of the statutory standards for leasehold valuation rep-
resented a radical departure from the general scheme of Washington
ad valorem taxation. 10 "It is clear that the legislature did not contem-
5. 78 Wn. 2d 48, 469 P.2d 902(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911(1971).
6. Ii is well established that private leasehold interests in publicly-owned land may
be taxed separately to the private party even if there is no specific statutory provisions
for separate assessment of leasehold interests and despite the usual practice (when
both the leasehold and reversion are privately held) of including the leasehold estate
in the assessment against the owner of the fee. Muir. Ad Valorem Tax Status of a
Private Lessee's Interest in Publicly Owned Property: Taxability of Possessory Interests
in Industrial Projects Under the New Mexico Industrial Revenue Bond Act, 3 N. MEX.
L. REv. 136 (1973). See also Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 78 Wn. 2d 48, 469 P.2d
902 (1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971); Keesling. Property Taxation of Leases
and Other Limited Interests, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 470 (1959).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. In fact. the method of valuation followed prior to Pier 67, whereby the rents
reserved and mortgage indebtedness are subtracted from the value of the property.
results in a valuation of zero in every case in which the lessee correctly estimates
future earnings and invests their present worth in the leasehold. De Luz Homes, Inc.
v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544, 558-59 (1955).
9. 78 Wn. 2d 48, 52, 469 P.2d 902, 905 (1970). For a discussion of the nature
and meaning of property and ownership as they relate to leasehold interests, see
Keeslng. Property Taxation of Leases and Other Limited Interests, 47 CALIF. L. REV.
470 (1959); Keesling. Conflicting Conceptions of Ownership in Taxation, 44 CALIF.
L. REv. 866 (1956).
10. 78 Wn. 2d at 54, 469 P.2d at 907. A liberal reading of the uniformity pro-
vision of the Washington Constitution leads to the conclusion that special assessment
standards for taxable leaseholds are inappropriate. Note, 46 WASH. L. REV. 795,
801 (197 1).
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plate appraising a leasehold in the manner required by the last Metro-
politan case."' The result of such a method of valuation was to
permit the lessee of publicly owned, tax-exempt land "to avoid taxa-
tion on a substantial portion of the value of his leasehold interest,"1 2
As a result of Pier 67, rents reserved or mortgage indebtedness could
not be deducted in determining taxable value of leaseholds in publicly
owned, tax-exempt land, The condemnation value, which represents
the lessee's equity in the leasehold, could not serve as the fair market
value for taxation purposes. 13
The practical effect of the court's decisibn in Pier 67 was to impose
an immediate tax burden on leaseholds in publicly owned, tax-exempt
land, leaseholds which had virtually escaped taxation under the
court's earlier decisions in the Metropolitan Building Company cases.
In April 1971, however, the Legislature enacted a "Leasehold Morato-
rium Act,"14 an interim measure, which in effect suspended applica-
tion of Pier 67; the Act provided the lessors and lessees of publicly
owned land two years in which to review and renegotiate the terms of
their leases in light of the court's holding in Pier 67.15
11. 78 Wn, 2d at 57, 469 P.2d at 908.
12, Id, at 55, 469 P,2d at 907.
13. The Washington court recognized that a leasehold may be of great value to a
party even if the earnings in excess of rents reserved and mortgage indebtedness
amount to zero, The court stated:
The market value of a leasehold is to be measured by considering both benefits
to be garnered from the use of the property over the term of the lease and the
burdens placed upon it. Burdens on the leasehold are restrictions which limit its
use. These burdens may arise from zoning ordinances or other legal limits on land
use or may be restrictions imposed by the terms of the lease itself,
Indebtedness does not represent a burden on the leasehold. Though it may be
a burden on the lessee, we have already concluded that the ad valorem tax is not
on the lessee's equity; it is on the value of the leasehold term. [Citation omitted].
The benefits of a leasehold may stem from its economic productivity. It cannot
be valued without reasonable knowledge of its probable remaining life. Further,
an option to renew the lease may increase the value of the leasehold because
it may afford an opportunity to extend the duration of the benefits.
These are some of the factors the assessor may take into consideration, but
they are not exclusive,
78 Wn. 2d at 57-58; 469 P.2d at 908-09.
14. Ch. 43, [1971] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. The measure was introduced Febru-
ary I. 1971, as H. B. 493 by Representative Bledsoe, el al, and codified as WAsn. REY.
CoDE ch. 84,40A (Supp 1972).
15. WAs. REY. Co DE §§ 84.40.030 & 84.40A,020 (Supp. 1972). The Leasehold
Moratorium Act provided that when the value of any taxable leasehold estate created
before January 1, 1971, is being determined for assessment before 1973, the present
worth of rentals and other consideration other than extensions or renewals made after
December 31, 1970, or the date of rental renegotiation, shall be deducted, Section 3
of The Moratorium Act required the assessor to "make any corrections in any assess-
ments heretofore or hereafter made... which may be necessary to make the assess-
915
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II. CHAPTER 187
At the close of the moratorium, in 1973, the Legislature enacted
the Leasehold Exemption Act16 (hereinafter cited as chapter 187 or
the Act). Rather than implement the clear mandate of Pier 67, the
Legislature chose simply to exempt from taxation all leases of tax-
exempt land predating the Pier 67 decision and meeting certain other
requirements.1 7 As a result, the Legislature further delayed implemen-
tation of the standard announced by the court in Pier 67, requiring its
application only to leases contracted after the decision.
Specifically, chapter 187 provides for a fourteen percent in lieu tax,
payable by the public lessor, which is to be imposed on the amount of
rental received in the previous year. The in lieu tax is intended to re-
place property taxes on certain leaseholds negotiated before July 1,
1970 which under Pier 67 standards would otherwise be paid by the
lessee.' 8 For the lessee to be thus exempt from property taxes under
the Pier 67 rule and the lessor to be subject to the fourteen percent in
lieu tax, the lease must have been contracted prior to July 1, 1970,
and not extended or renewed since that date, and it must provide for a
rent of at least ninety percent of the "full economic" rental value of
the property.19 Other leaseholds, those contracted after the July 1,
1970, cut-off date and all those predating July 1, 1970, but since re-
negotiated or not requiring at least ninety percent of full economic
ments conform with the provisions of . . this 1971 amendatory act." The King
County Assessor, on advice of the prosecuting attorney, challenged the validity of the
moratorium and refused to deduct rents reserved as required. The validity of the
Act was upheld in Collins v. Hoppe, Civil No. 747738 (King Co. Sup. Ct. 1972).
Similarly, the constitutionality of a California leasehold moratorium was upheld
in Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d 736.
6 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960), on the theory that even though the California Constitution
requires an assessment based upon full cash value, the Legislature can prescribe a
deviation for the limited purpose of restricting a change in the case law to have
prospective effect only.
16. Section 4 of ch. 43 directed the Legislative Council and the Department of
Revenue to review methods and procedures for the assessment and valuation of
taxable leasehold estates and present recommendations to the Legislature. WASH. REV.
CODE § 84.40A.040 (Supp. 1972).
17. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
18. Ch. 187, § 2, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.0 10 (Supp. 1973).
19. Ch. 187, §§ 4, I1, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.29.030, 84.36.450 (Supp. 1973).
Economic rent is the full amount that would be paid for a comparable lease of
private property, taking into consideration the private rate of return and normal
costs to the private sector. See ch. 187, § 3(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.020(I) (Supp.
1973).
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rent,20 are subject to property tax levies due and payable by the lessee
in 1974 and subsequent years, based on the Pier 67 rule.
Chapter 187 also renders a number of leases exempt from both the
in lieu tax and the property tax. For example, leases on federally
owned land 2' contracted prior to July 1, 1970, which have not since
been renegotiated, are fully exempt if the lessee is paying at least ninety
percent of economic rent.22 Other provisions exempt certain other
specified leaseholds23 from the ad valorem property tax regardless of
the date the lease was contracted, whether it has been renegotiated
and whether the lessee is paying at least ninety percent of economic
rent. 24 Finally, if a lessee would be exempt if he owned the property,
20. The term renegotiation is rather narrowly defined for purposes of the Act.
See note 40 and accompanying text infra.
21 For discussion of a state's taxing of leases of federally owned land, see Pierce,
Tax Immunity Should Not Mean Tax Inequity, 1959 Wisc. L. REv. 173 (1959);
Comment, State Taxation of Private Interests in Federally Owned Property, 19 LA.
L. REV. 475 (1959).
22. Ch. 187, § 1 I(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.450 (Supp. 1973).
23. Those exempted include all leasehold estates in which the total economic rent
is less than $100 per year; all leasehold estates in facilities owned or used by a school,
college or university which provide housing for students and are otherwise exempt
under general tax exemption statutes; all leasehold estates of subsidized housing
where the federal, state or local government owns the property and where an income
qualification exists for such housing; all leasehold estates used for fair purposes by a
nonprofit fair association where the fee is held by the federal, state or local govern-
ment (no exemption for any sublease of such nonprofit fair association where the fee
is held by the federal, state or local government; all leasehold estates of state forest
lands as defined in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 76.12 (Supp. 1972); all leasehold estates in
state property used as a residence by state employees who are required as a condition
of their employment to live at a state facility -or station; all leasehold estates on real
property owned by any Indian or Indian tribe where the land is held in trust by the
federal government or is subject to a restriction of alienation imposed by the federal
government; and all leasehold estates held by enrolled Indians or land owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribe where the fee is vested in or held in trust by the federal
government and which land is not subleased to another who would not qualify (for
exemption) pursuant to ch. 187. Only the leasehold estates exempted in § 11(1) may
be subject to the in lieu tax of § 4. Leasehold estates in operating properties vested in
any company which is assessed or taxed as a public utility pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 84.12 (Supp. 1972) are neither exempt from taxation nor subject to the in
lieu tax. Ch. 187, § 11, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.450 (Supp. 1973).
24. These are three of the four criteria for exemption from the ad valorem
property tax and imposition of the 14% in lieu tax on the lessor. The fourth criterion
is that the leasehold be an interest in property owned in fee or held in trust by the
federal government or by the state of Washington or any political subdivision thereof.
Ch. 187, § 11, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.450 (Supp. 1973). The leaseholds listed in
note 23 supra are specifically exempted from the in lieu tax by a proviso in § 4 of
the Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.030 (Supp. 1973). Also, the in lieu tax does not
apply to a lease of lands owned in fee or held in trust by the government of the
United States. Id.
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the leasehold also is exempt from both the in lieu and the ad valorem
property taxes.2 5
The Act requires each county assessor to identify the properties
subject to the in lieu tax and determine the amount of the contract
rent.26 The fourteen percent in lieu tax, when imposed, is payable to
the State Department of Revenue by April 30 of each year.2 7 These
revenues then are distributed to each county according to its propor-
tionate share of the total funds collected through application of the in
lieu tax, with sixty percent of the receipts for each county earmarked
for schools, twenty-five percent for cities and towns and the remainder
to county government generally. 28
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
Of all the steps necessary to determine property tax liability, assess-
ment is not only the most critical but also the most difficult to mon-
itor. The valuation of a property interest demands a "high degree of
discretion, judgment, and opinion,"29 especially when that property is
a leasehold interest.3 0 Unfortunately for those administering the Act,
chapter 187 fails to clarify the assessment procedure to be pursued in
valuing such interests.31 Other administrative problems arise because
the definitions in the Act are imprecise and may invite litigation. 32
Furthermore, time deadlines for reporting, assessment and distribution
of in lieu tax revenues are of questionable wisdom.33
25. Ch. 187, § 4, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.030 (Supp. 1973).
26. Ch. 187, § 6, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.050 (Supp. 1973).
27. Ch. 187, § 7, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.060 (Supp. 1973).
28. Ch. 187, § 8, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.070 (Supp. 1973). See note 55 and
accompanying text infra for more discussion of this distribution system.
29. Comment, Real Property Tax Assessment in Montana, 34 MONT. L. REV.
300 (1973).
30. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES, PERCENTAGES, SHORT AND LONG TERM
(5th ed. 1959).
31. The procedures contemplated by ch. 187 introduce new terms and thus new
methods with which the assessor must work. It appears simpler and more logical to
utilize the same methods for valuing and assessing leasehold interests as are used to
value and assess taxable property in general. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
32. Testimony of Charles W. Hodde, Lobbyist for Washington Grain Exporters.
before the Washington State House Committee on Ways and Means, in Seattle,
Washington, Aug. 15, 1973. See also note 37 and accompanying text infra.
33. See ch. 187, §8 5-8, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.29.040-.070 (Supp. 1973).
Normally, the assessment process is completed by May 31. Ch. 187 provides the
county assessor only one month (Jan. 15 to Feb. 15) to complete the laborious
process of determining the lessees which qualify for the 14% in lieu tax.
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The practical impact of chapter 187 on the operations of the as-
sessor has, in fact, been termed an "administrative nightmare"34 prin-
cipally because upon the interpretation and application of two inde-
pendent terms--"economic rent" and "renegotiation"-turns the
rather significant question of who pays the tax. Each county assessor
is required to determine the "contract rent" and the "economic rent"
of each particular lease of publicly owned, tax exempt land within his
respective county.35 Although "contract rent" is normally not too dif-
ficult to define and determine simply by examining the lease, the
meaning of "economic rent" is a bit more elusive.
Section 3(1) of chapter 187 defines economic rent as follows:
the rental warranted to be paid in the open real estate market based on
rentals being paid for comparable leases. In the determination of "eco
nomic rent" the private rate of return and normal costs to be [sic] pri-
vate sector shall be considered.
Difficulty arises in determining exactly what is "the real estate
market." How broad a market is to be considered? Are leases in Se-
attle suburbs to be compared with leases in downtown Seattle? Even if
"the real estate market" can be identified, finding a "comparable
lease" may be a Herculean feat in itself. The inherent variation in
terms from lease to lease prohibits, or at least makes exceedingly diffi-
cult, meaningful comparisons.36 Determining "the private rate of re-
turn" and "normal costs to the private sector" may also be a rather
involved process for the assessor. Some assessors fear that the many
variables in this formula will encourage appeals, perhaps indefinite-
ly.37 For example, a determination by the assessor that the contractual
34. Testimony of Harley H. Hoppe, King County Assessor, before the Washington
State House Committee on Ways and Means, in Seattle, Washington, Aug. 15, 1973,
at 4.
35. Ch. 187, § 5, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.040 (Supp. 1973) requires each public
lessor to furnish the assessor with an accounting of outstanding leasehold estates
upon its property on or before Jan. 15. However, there are no means available for
the assessor to enforce this provision. Thus, the full burden of accounting for such
leasehold estates will, in most cases, fall upon the assessor.
36. Testimony of Harley H. Hoppe, King County Assessor, Washington State
House Committee on Ways and Means, in Seattle, Washington, Aug. 15, 1973, at 2.
37. Testimony on this point was presented by several parties at a hearing before
the Washington State House Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 36. Legis-
lators also expressed some concern on this point at the same meeting. Harley H.
Hoppe suggested the establishment of a private advisory board on the subject so as to
provide assessors with guidance. Id.
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rent is near ninety percent of economic rent may well be contested by
one of the parties to the lease. It will be an unusual lessee who will
admit that he is not paying at least ninety percent of economic rent if
the issue is at all close. Because the assessor's resolution of the eco-
nomic rent issue determines whether the lessor or the lessee bears the
tax burden,38 adoption of chapter 187 may add to the workload of the
county board of equalization and the state board of tax appeals by
increasing the number of tax appeals. 39
The assessor's decision whether a lease has been "renegotiated"
since July 1, 1970, determines who must bear the tax burden. Section
3(3) defines "renegotiation" to mean "the process occasioned by any
situation or circumstance which results in a change in consideration to
be paid by the lessee to the lessor for any extension or renewal of a
lease." 40 If the assessor determines that the lease has not been renego-
tiated, within the meaning of the Act, since July 1, 1970, then the
lessor may be required to pay the fourteen percent in lieu tax, pro-
vided the other criteria in the Act for imposing the in lieu tax are also
met; if he finds that it has been renegotiated since July 1, 1970, then
the lessee is subject to the ad valorem property tax irrespective of the
other criteria. Thus, an inquiry into what constitutes renegotiation is
of some significance.
38. County assessors do not want this kind of power. Appraisal of property is a
difficult enough process by itself without the added burden of knowing that a determi-
nation of a few dollars one way or the other will decide which party to the lease will
pay taxes on the property. Furthermore, lessees and lessors may find the burden of
taxation shifting from year to year as the fair market value of the property (and thus
economic rent) fluctuate, thus hindering wise tax and investment planning.
Conversations with assessors and members of their staff, as well as testimony pre-
sented at public hearings, indicate apprehension on the part of the assessors concern-
ing the implementation and administration of ch. 187, especially with respect to the
issue of economic rent. Assessors have, in the past, attempted to determine economic
rent, but have not used it as the major criterion for determining the assessed value of
the leasehold interest nor for determining which party must pay the tax. Normally,
the tax levy is restricted to the private ownership interest in the property. See note 102
and accompanying text infra.
It is suggested that statutory standards should relieve the assessor of discretion
rather than granting greater discretion. His task should be made less subjective. Note,
1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 136 (1968).
39. If the assessor determines that the lessee is paying only 89% of economic rent,
then the lessee will pay ad valorem taxes on 50% of the true and fair market value
of the leasehold interest, as contemplated by the court in Pier 67, supra note 5. On
the other hand, if the assessor determines that the lessee is paying 91% of economic
rent, then the lessor-the public, tax exempt entity-must bear the 14% in lieu tax
based on the previous year's rentals.
40. Ch. 187, § 3(3), WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.020 (Supp. 1973).
920
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As noted above, a lease is deemed to have been renegotiated only if
there is a change in the consideration paid by the lessee to the lessor
accompanied by an extension or renewal of the lease. Thus, although
the intent of the 1971 Moratorium Act was to provide lessees an op-
portunity to renegotiate their leases in light of the impending imposi-
tion of property taxes required by Pier 67, chapter 187 so defines re-
negotiation as to exempt from ad valorem property tax those lessees
who failed to renegotiate when the opportunity arose, while taxing
those who did renegotiate-a rather anomalous result. Furthermore,
renegotiation, as defined by the Act, does not include a change in con-
sideration to be paid by the lessee to the lessor accompanied by a re-
duction in the term of the lease but does include a change in consider-
ation accompanied by an extension or renewal of the lease. Therefore,
parties may adjust their lease by reducing its term and changing the
rental payable and the lessee will still be exempt from ad valorem
property taxation. The recent modification of the Olympic Hotel lease
in downtown Seattle illustrates how this result may occur.
The Seattle Olympic Hotel Company leases a portion of the Metro-
politan Tract (part of the original University of Washington campus)
from the University of Washington. The terms of the hotel lease were
altered to reflect the current climate of the hotel business by in-
creasing the guaranteed minimum annual rent for the University,
shortening the lease period and providing that the University and the
Seattle Olympic would share equally any leasehold taxes.41 Despite
the fact that the lease was greatly altered, and that the parties clearly
contemplated the imposition of property taxes upon the lessee as re-
quired by Pier 67, this renegotiation probably does not fall within the
definition in the Act, simply because the term of the lease was reduced
rather than renewed or extended.42
41. Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce, Dec. 16, 1972, col. 5.
42. But see 17 Op. Att'y Gen. at 6-7, n. 2 (1973) where Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral William Dexter stated:
Because section 11 of chapter 187 speaks not only of those leases which have
been "renegotiated" since July 1, 1970, but of those that have been extended or
renewed since then as well, it will be seen that a leasehold which has been ex-
tended or renewed since that date will be subject to the property tax and not the
excise tax even if no change in consideration payable from lessee to lessor has
been negotiated.
Section 11 of the Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.450 (Supp. 1973), does refer to
leases which have not been "renegotiated, extended, or renewed since July 1, 1970
.... and serves to support Mr. Dexter's conclusion. Note, however, that even Dexter's
921
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Floor debate in the Senate indicated that the legislature was well
aware of this restrictive definition of renegotiation. 43 It is unclear,
however, why the Legislature chose to define renegotiation so restric-
tively, distinguishing between an extension or renewal and a reduction
in the term of the lease, rather than including in the definition any
modification in term and consideration. One might expect that rene-
gotiation would be defined to include modifications to a lease in-
volving any change in consideration and/or any change in the term of
the lease rather than restricting the coverage of the term renegotiation
as the Legislature has chosen to do. The purpose of keying the operation
of the property tax to renegotiation was to avoid the inequity of taxing
lessees who were "locked into" long term leases at the time Pier 67 was
decided; 44 but lessees like Seattle Olympic who are able to modify
their lease by changing the consideration while shortening its term
hardly appear to be "locked into" a lease. With so insignificant a dis-
tinction, it seems inequitable to tax the lessee in the one situation and
the public lessor in the other.45
IV. IMPACT OF THE FOURTEEN PERCENT
IN LIEU TAX
The rationale behind imposing an in lieu tax on pre-1970 leases46 is
to equalize the effective tax burdens on lessees of publicly owned, tax
exempt land under leases contracted before and after Pier 67. The
Legislature reasoned that the lessee of publicly owned, tax exempt land
who contracted the lease before July 1, 1970, if he pays at least ninety
percent of economic rent, is paying rental equivalent to that which
would be charged a lessee of comparable, privately owned land. The
opinion does not include shortening the term of the lease, even if there is a change in
consideration payable.
43. SeeWAsH. S. JOUR. 1343 (1973).
44. See ch. 187, § 2, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.0 10 (Supp. 1973).
45. There is no reason to exempt a lease which has in fact been renegotiated to
the extent that consideration has changed, but the term simply shortened rather than
extended. Parties should not be rewarded for failing to adjust the lease for tax pur-
poses when the 9pportunity arose. Such special treatment is unjustifiable on grounds
of equity, economics or sound public relations. On its face, the renegotiation definition
is the type of legislation which invites allegations of "pork barrel" legislating: it cer-
tainly does not serve to enhance the apparent integrity or reliability of the Legislature
in the eyes of the public.
46. "Pre-1970" leases include leases which were contracted prior to July 1, 1970,
requiring the lessee to pay at least 90% of economic rent and which have not since
been renegotiated.
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rent paid by the latter includes an imputed property tax payable by
the owner but shifted to the lessee. Similarly, the pre-1970 lessee, who
has not renegotiated and who is paying at least ninety percent of eco-
nomic rent, is assumed to be paying an imputed property tax. How-
ever, the lessor of publicly owned, tax exempt land does not pay any
property tax even though the lessee may be paying the equivalent of
an imputed property tax as part of his rental. Thus, the Legislature
concluded that imposing an ad valorem property tax on these lessees
as contemplated by Pier 67 would effectively subject them to double
taxation. 47 It further assumed that lessees who have renegotiated their
leases since July 1, 1970, even though they may be paying at least
ninety percent of economic rent, have adjusted their lease so as to mit-
igate any burden of double taxation. Those lessees paying less than
ninety percent of economic rent are subjected to property tax since
they are assumed not to be paying any imputed property tax.48
The reasoning may be clarified by an illustration. If B leases a house
to A for $200 per month, B knows that $200 will cover costs and
allow him a profit as well. Part of B's costs are property taxes. Thus,
A, by paying $200 per month in rental for the house, is paying an
imputed property tax which B in effect collects for the local taxing
districts. However, if B is not liable for general ad valorem property
taxes, i.e., B is a tax-exempt lessor, and A is paying approximately the
economic rent charged by lessors who do pay such taxes, A is still in ef-
fect paying an imputed property tax as part of his $20.0 rental. If A is
now taxed for the value of his leasehold interest as well, he is effectively
subjected to double taxation. 49
The intent of chapter 187 is to remove this double burden from the
lessee of a pre-1970 lease who is paying at least ninety percent of eco-
nomic rent by exempting the lessee from taxation and imposing an in
lieu tax on the public lessor-in effect collecting the imputed tax
which the lessor had been retaining as part of its profits, an admirable
47. Memorandum from Stan Finkelstein, Research Analyst, to Representative
Irving Newhouse, Washington State House Committee on Ways and Means, May 2,
1972.
48. Note that this assumption is made if the lessee is paying 89.99% of economic
rent, whereas the opposite assumption is made if the lessee is paying 90% of eco-
nomic rent. Such slim percentages will determine whether the lessee or the lessor
will pay a tax under ch. 187. See note 39 supra.
49. The Legislature has assumed that such double taxation does not exist if A is
not paying at least 90% of economic rent. This may or may not be true since the
Legislature has failed to demonstrate that the 90% rental figure has economic signifi-
cance. It appears to be an arbitrary cutoff or at best an educated guess.
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goal. The in lieu tax rate of fourteen percent imposed upon the pre-
vious year's rent was chosen by the Legislature to produce revenue
equivalent to a one percent ad valorem property tax rate upon lease-
hold interests, a tax rate corresponding to that applicable to taxable
property in general, thereby fully replacing the tax revenues which
local taxing districts anticipated after Pier 67 but which have been
denied them by the 1971 Moratorium Act and by the exemption of
pre-1970 leases in chapter 187.50 However, judging from estimates
that the in lieu tax revenues, realized by local taxing districts will not
match the ad valorem property tax revenues foregone, many local
taxing districts will suffer a net loss in tax revenues.51
50. Discussion with Stan Finkelstein, Research Analyst for House Committee on
Ways and Means, in Olympia, Washington, Aug. 20, 1973.
A one percent rate was chosen for comparison in light of the (then) predicted
passage of Senate Joint Resolution I (amending WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2) and Ini-
tiative Measure No. 44, ch. 2, [1973] Wash. Laws (twenty mil limit for regular
property taxes), measures to limit the effective general ad valorem property tax rate
to one percent of true and fair value. Both were approved by the voters November 7,
1972.
51. It appears that in lieu revenues will not match ad valorem tax revenues that
would be generated if ch. 187 were not in existence and Pier 67 were effective. A pro-
jection done by the King County Department of Assessments concerning the impact
of cli. 187 on King County taxing districts indicates the following:
Estimated 1974 ad valorem All taxing districts
taxes if ch. 187 inoperative in King County
(and Pier 67 effective) based
on 1973 assessments S 2.500.000
Estimated 1974 in lieu tax $ 1,200,000
Estimated 1974 ad valorem
taxes on lessee owned im-
provements and unqualified
leases 400,000
Total 1974 taxes based on ch. 187 1,600,000
Net loss of anticipated tax
revenues 900.000
This revenue reduction is spread among the taxing districts within King County as
follows:
State $ 187,509
County 49,484
City 222,501
Port 70,497
Schools 304,006
Others 66,003
Total reduction 900,000
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Projections done for King County by the Department of Assess-
ments indicate that ad valorem property tax revenues for 1974 would
have been approximately $2.5 million if chapter 187 were not in ex-
istence and Pier 67 were fully effective. Estimated revenues from in
lieu tax payments and ad valorem property taxes on leases not quali-
fying under chapter 187, as well as ad valorem taxes on lessee owned
improvements, amount to $1.6 million. Thus, the net loss in antici-
pated tax revenues amounts to approximately $900,000, with each
taxing district sharing a portion of this loss. 52
The fourteen percent in lieu tax, when imposed, is payable to the
Director of the State Department of Revenue by April 30. 53 The
Director transmits the funds collected to the state treasurer Who dis-
burses the funds to each county in proportion to the amount of in lieu
funds collected within each county.54 Section 8(3) of the Act provides
further that within each county sixty percent of the county's receipts
from the in lieu tax are to be returned to school districts, twenty-five
percent of the county's receipts to cities and towns within the county
and the remainder to the county legislative authority which "may allo-
cate and deposit... [the receipts] to the credit of the taxing districts
in the county in the manner it deems most equitable" or may retain
them in the county current expense fund.55
Normally, each taxing district receives ad valorem property tax
revenues proportionate to the property tax base and the millage levied
by the district within the boundaries of the district. Section 8(3) pro-
vides for ratable distribution of the in lieu funds by a similar method,
at least for school districts and cities and towns within each county.
However, revenues to be returned to districts out of the remainder of
It must be noted that these estimates are really nothing more than educated guesses
on the part of the county staff. The figures are subject to change due to the amounts
of rents actually collected in 1973 and the effect of the rules and regulations to be is-
sued by the State Department of Revenue. The status of leases with the Boeing Com-
pany alone will greatly effect the in lieu tax paid by the city and county and the rev-
enue to be received by each under ch. 187 as well as the accuracy of the above
figures. See letter to Robert W. Bratton, Deputy County Executive, from King County
Assessor, Harley H. Hoppe, Nov. 19, 1973.
The term "local taxing districts" is used to refer to all those entities listed above,
i.e., state, county, city, port, schools and others.
52. See note 51 supra.
53. Ch. 187, § 7, WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.060 (Supp. 1973).
54. Ch. 187, § 8(1), (2), WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.29.070(1) & (2) (Supp. 1973).
55. Ch. 187, § 8(3), WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.070(3) (Supp. 1973).
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the in lieu funds in each county are left to the discretion of the county
legislative authority. Such a distribution plan may well favor some
taxing districts over others.
Examination of 116 Port of Seattle leases indicates that 13 are eli-
gible for ad valorem property tax exemption under chapter 187.56
These 13 leases have an estimated total assessed value of $375,920
which would generate $15,923 in ad valorem revenues. 57 Under
chapter 187, the 13 lessees save a total of $3,855 in ad valorem
property taxes (but still have to pay $12,068 in taxes for lessee
owned improvements). 58 To compensate taxing districts generally
for this tax benefit to these lessees, the Act requires the lessor, the
Port in this instance, to pay a $9,162 in lieu tax on rentals received.5 9
However, whether the Port will receive sufficient in lieu tax revenues
from the state to compensate for its lost ad valorem revenues and for
the in lieu tax payments it must pay in its role as a lessor cannot be
estimated reliably because the Port's share under the distribution plan
will only be determined after the county legislative authority decides
how to distribute the fifteen percent of in lieu tax revenues which are
returned to the county.
It is unclear why the Legislature chose to return sixty percent of in
lieu funds ratably to school districts and twenty-five percent to cities
and towns within each county, while leaving other taxing districts to
dicker with the county legislative authority over the amount each is to
receive.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHAPTER 187
A. Excise Versus Property Tax
Chapter 187 raises at least four constitutional issues. The first
hinges on whether the fourteen percent in lieu tax is an excise tax or a
56. Testimony of Harley H. Hoppe, King County Assessor, before the Washing-
ton State House Committee on Ways and Means, in Seattle, Washington, Aug. 15.
1973, at 4.
57. Id.
58. Although it is not altogether clear from a reading of ch. 187 whether lessee
owned improvements are to be taxed to the lessees, it is assumed that this is the intent.
See ch. 187, § 15, WASH. REv. CODE § 84.36.460 (Supp. 1973) and note 51 supra.
59. Testimony of Harley H. Hoppe, King County Assessor, before the Washington
State House Committee on Ways and Means, in Seattle, Washington, August 15, 1973.
at 4.
926
Vol. 49: 913, 1974
Taxation of Leasehold Interests
property tax. If a property tax, it may well violate the Washington
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of a property tax upon
public property.6 0
The distinction between property taxes and excise taxes has been
examined in three leading Washington decisionsP In the first of
these, Jensen v. Henneford, the court declared the personal net in-
come tax act of 1935 unconstitutional, holding as follows: 62
[T] he mere right to own and hold property cannot be made the subject of
an excise tax, because to tax by reason of ownership of property is to
tax the property itself.
The right to receive property (income in this instance) is but a neces-
sary element of ownership, and, without such right to receive, the
ownership is but an empty thing and of no value whatever.
The court noted that a tax imposed on income from property was in
fact a tax on' property, even though the statute in that case purported
to levy a tax upon "the privilege of receiving income. ' 63 "The char-
acter of a tax is to be determined by its incidence, not by its name. '64
In the second case, the Washington Supreme Court held in Apart-
60. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amendment 14) provides: "Property of the
United States and of the state, counties, school district and other municipal corpora-
tions.., shall be exempt from taxation."
61. This does not imply that there are no other cases on this issue. See notes 62
and 63 infra.
62. 185 Wash. 209, 218-19, 53 P.2d 607, 610-11 (1936). Jensen followed the
court's decision in Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933), which in-
validated the state income tax law of 1932 as an unconstitutional tax on property.
The court in Culliton held that, under the state constitution, income is property and
that an income tax is a property tax and not an excise tax. The court reached a simi-
lar conclusion in Petroleum Navigation Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 495, 55 P.2d
1056 (1936), and Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn. 2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
63. 185 Wash. at 218-19, 53 P.2d at 610-11. This assertion in the income tax act
was an effort to avoid the court's decision in Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25
P.2d 81 (1933), the initial case invalidating a state income tax, wherein the 1932 tax
act in question did not distinguish between a tax on income and a tax on the privilege
of receiving income. In the 1935 act, the Legislature intended to rely on State ex rel.
Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933) which upheld the constitutionality
of an act imposing a tax on the privilege of engaging in business activities in the state
(a business and occupation tax).
64. 185 Wash. at 217, 53 P.2d at 610. The court noted that the Legislature had
labeled the tax act a tax on the privilege of receiving net income and then stated:
"The legislature may declare its intended purpose in an act, but it is for the courts to
'declare the nature and effect of the act. The character of a tax is determined by its
incidents, not by its name," Analogously, the Legislature has termed the ch. 187 tax
an "in lieu excise tax" but it may be in nature and effect a tax upon property. See
text accompanying note 77 infra.
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ment Operators Association v. Schumacher that "a tax on rental in-
come is a tax on property, and not an excise tax." 65 Accordingly, the
court invalidated a tax on rents received by lessors exceeding $300
per month, because it constituted a second tax upon rented real estate
and, therefore, violated the uniformity clause of the state constitution,
there being no corresponding property tax on unrented real estate.66
Finally, in Black v. State,67 the court upheld a "retail sales tax"
imposed on a floating hotel in Seattle during the 1962 World's Fair.
The court held the tax to be one on the transaction of leasing tangible
personal property and, therefore, an excise tax, not a tax on property. 68
The court noted:6 9
[Taxes on property] as used in the organic law, means taxes on
things tangible or intangible, as distinguished from taxation on the
right to use or transfer things, or on the proceeds of business in which
the use of things is essential.
The court cited other standard tax principles to support its statement
that the tax involved was an excise tax on the transaction of leasing
tangible personal property.70
Jensen and Apt. Operators dealt with taxes upon rental of real
property, whereas Black dealt solely and specifically with a tax upon
the rental of personal property. The court was urged in Black to apply
the same reasoning to rental of personal property as it applied in Apt.
Operators and Jensen to rental of real property. 71 However, the Black
court chose not to do so and evidently attempted to distinguish, rather
than overule, its decision in Apt. Operators:72
65. 56 Wn. 2d 46, 47, 351 P.2d 124, 125 (1960). See also Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 480(1895).
66. The uniformity clause, WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amendment 14), ap-
plies to property taxes, but not excise taxes. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text
infra.
67. 67 Wn. 2d 97, 406 P.2d 761 (1965).
68. Id. at 99, 406 P.2d at 762.
69. Id. at 99, 406 P.2d at 762, quoting Annot., 103 A.L.R. 19 (1936).
70. See treatises and cases cited in 67 Wn. 2d at 99, 406 P.2d at 762. For similar
definition by other courts, see Head v. Cigarette Sales Co.. 188 Ga. 452, 4 S.E.2d 203,
207-08 (1939); Stults Eagle Drug Co. v. Luke, 48 Ariz. 467, 62 P.2d 1126, 1129-30
(1936); City of De Land v. Florida Public Service Co., 119 Fla. 804, 161 So. 735.
738 (1935).
71. See Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Black v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 97, 406 P.2d 761
(1965).
72. 67 Wn. 2d at 100, 406 P.2d at 763 (emphasis in opinion). The two cases ap-
pear to be inconsistent since they both involve a tax on the rental of property. The
court, however, failed to specifically address this inconsistency. The court's emphasis
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To the extent that the per curiam opinion in Apartment Operators
Ass'n v. Schumacher . . .may seem to make statements inconsistent
with the above outlined principles, it is hereby deemed not controlling
in the instant case.
The proposition that a tax upon rental income from real property is a
tax upon property thus has twice been upheld by the Washington
court.73 If this proposition continues as good law after Black, which
apparently it does since the Black court attempted to distinguish
rather than overrule Jensen and Apt. Operators, the in lieu tax im-
posed by chapter 187 upon rentals received by public lessors appears
unconstitutional as a property tax imposed upon publicly owned, tax
exempt property.
Furthermore, even if Apt. Operators is no longer good law after
Black, statements cited by the Black court, although equivocal, may
lend support to the claim that the in lieu tax of chapter 187 is a prop-
erty tax due to the assessment process contemplated: 74
If a tax is imposed directly by the legislature without assessment, and
its sum is measured by the amount of business done or the extent to
which the conferred privileges have been enjoyed or exercised by the
taxpayer, irrespective of the nature or value of the taxpayer's assets, it
is regarded as an excise; but if the tax is computed upon a valuation of
property, and assessed by assessors either where it is situated or at the
owner's domicile, although privileges may be included in the valua-
tion, it is considered a property tax.
This distinction has been relied upon to uphold the business and occu-
pation tax as an excise on the privilege of engaging in a business activ-
ity, rather than a tax on property, i.e., on income from property.
7 5
Application of this distinction to uphold the in lieu tax of chapter 187
as an excise tax may be questioned, however, since the fourteen per-
cent in lieu tax is not imposed without assessment-or at least not
that the two cases "may seem" to be inconsistent tends to indicate that the court was
implicitly recognizing the distinction between tangible personal property and real
property. If the court had not emphasized the seeming inconsistency, it would be
more likely that Black overruled Apt. Operators. At best, any conclusion is unsure.
In any event, Black appears to be distinguishable on its facts.
73. The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion concerning a
tax upon rentals. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
74. 67 Wn. 2d at 99, 406 P.2d at 762, quoting Annot., 103 A.L.R. 19 (1936)
(emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., H & B Communications Corp. v. Richland, 79 Wn. 2d 312, 484 P.2d
1141 (1971); Clifford v. State, 78 Wn. 2d 4,469 P.2d 549 (1970).
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without use of the assessment process. Initially, to bring a leasehold
within the in lieu tax provisions of chapter 187, the county assessor
must determine that the lease in question was contracted prior to July
1, 1970, that it has not since been renegotiated, and that the lessee is
paying at least ninety percent of economic rent. Although this may not
resemble an assessment in the purely technical sense of the term, when
one notes the assessor's involvement in determining economic rent,
amounting to valuation of the leasehold interest, combined with the
Legislature's intention that the in lieu tax replace ad valorem property
taxes on lessees,76 and one further notes the Legislature's apparent
concern, as evidenced by the severability clause, that the in lieu tax
may be held a property tax,77 the legislative assertion that the in lieu
tax is an excise tax seems more questionable. Arguably, at best, the in
lieu tax appears to be a cross between an excise and a property tax,
having attributes of both. A more persuasive conclusion may be that
the in lieu tax of chapter 187 is an unconstitutional tax on publicly
owned, tax exempt property.78
B. Uniformity in Taxation
Regardless of whether the in lieu tax is classified as an excise or
property tax, the uniformity requirement of the Washington Constitu-
tion may present a second constitutional ground for attack upon
chapter 187, which might be argued by the lessee of publicly owned,
tax-exempt land who must pay ad valorem property taxes on his
leasehold interest. The Washington Constitution requires that:79
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the
territorial limits of the authority laying the tax and shall be levied, and
collected for public purposes only. The word "property" as used
76. See text accompanying note 50 supra. But see ch. 187, § 2, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.29.010 (Supp. 1973).
77. The sweeping effect of the proviso in the severability clause of section 13 of
the Act, noted in WASH. REV. CODE § 82.29.010 (Supp. 1973), may indicate the
Legislature's uncertainty in declaring the in lieu tax to be an excise tax:
If any provision of the 1973 amendatory act, or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the 1973 amendatory act. or the
application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected:
PROVIDED, That if the leasehold in lieu excise tax imposed by section 4 of this
1973 amendatory act is held invalid, the entirety of the act, except for section 3
and section 15, [sic] shall be null and void.
See notes 96-98 and accompanying text infra.
78. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
79. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § I (amendment 14).
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herein shall mean and include everything, whether tangible or intangi-
ble, subject to ownership. All real estate shall constitute one class
If a tax is determined to be an excise tax, the constitutional provision
requiring uniformity does not apply;80 it does apply, however, to
property taxes.81 Lessees paying ad valorem property taxes under
chapter 187 may claim that the failure to tax all lessees of publicly
owned, tax-exempt land violates this uniformity requirement.
Those leases which do not meet certain requirements for time of
negotiation and amount of rental8 2 are subject to ad valorem property
taxation under chapter 187. Leases which do meet these requirements
are exempt from ad valorem property taxation. Thus, some lessees of
publicly owned, tax-exempt land must pay property taxes while others
do not. Arguably, the same class of property, i.e., leasehold interests
in publicly owned, tax-exempt land, is not being taxed uniformly as
required by the Washington Constitution. However, because leasehold
interests are defined as personal property and because reasonable clas-
sifications of personal property for tax purposes are permitted by the
Washington Constitution,8 3 this attack may fall to the argument that
the Legislature has validly created two reasonable classes of taxable
interests: (1) those contracted prior to July 1, 1970, not since renego-
tiated and requiring at least ninety percent of economic rent and (2)
those contracted after July 1, 1970, and those contracted prior to July
1, 1970, but since renegotiated or requiring less than ninety percent of
economic rent. Absent a successful attack on the reasonableness of
this classification, the uniformity clause has been complied with.8 4
80. Black v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 97, 100, 406 P.2d 761, 763 (1965) and cases cited
therein.
81. Apt. Operators Ass'n, Inc. v. Schumacher, 56 Wn. 2d 46, 351 P.2d 124 (1960).
82. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
83. For the definition of personal property, see WASH. REV. CODE § 84.04.080
(1963). Leases are defined as personal property for purposes of taxation, so that the
leasehold interest can be taxed and the tax collected, when the lease is on tax exempt
land. See gier 67, 78 Wn. 2d at 52-54, 469 P.2d at 905-07. Reasonable classifications
of personal property are not foreclosed by the state constitution, but rather are as-
sumed by the constitutional language. See WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also Ex rel
Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P.2d 539 (1934) (purpose of
the fourteenth amendment to permit departure from the rigid requirement of uni-
formity, making it possible to classify different kinds of property and levy different
rates according to classes); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1051 (1946).
84. It would appear that the classification of leaseholds in ch. 187 is reasonable for
purposes of property taxation. See State v. Hi-Lo Foods, Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 534, 383
P.2d 910 (1963). Therefore, an equal protection argument under the fourteenth
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C. The Distribution Plan
A third constitutional challenge to chapter 187 might be based on
the inconsistency of the distribution formula provided for in section
8(3) of the Act with the constitutional prohibition on imposition of a
state tax for local purposes. 85 The state may authorize local authori-
ties to impose a tax;86 under chapter 187, however, the revenue from
tax imposed by the state is returned under a distribution formula to
local taxing districts, to be used for local purposes. The in lieu tax
thus acts as a state tax for local purposes and, therefore, appears to
violate this constitutional prohibition.
At the same time it must be recognized that a state tax imposed on
local districts or local inhabitants to support an activity of statewide
interest would not fall within the constitutional ban. Thus, the sixty
percent distribution of funds to school districts would probably survive
constitutional challenge, being considered a state tax for a state pur-
pose. Furthermore, as there exists a strong presumption that where the
amendment of the United States Constitution, assailing the discrimination between
leases entered into prior to July I, 1970, and those entered into or renegotiated after
that date, also would find little support. However, one might pursue the argument in
regard to the reasonableness of the classification for excise tax purposes. See text
accompanying note 94 infra.
Although the court in Pier 67 did not consider the constitutionality of WASH. REV.
CODE § 84.04.080 (1963), it is questionable whether the Legislature validly can cate-
gorize leases of real property as personal property. Categorization of "an interest in
real property as personal property rather than as real property is contrary to the
commonly accepted notion that a portion of something is of the same character or
nature as the whole. It is also inconsistent with all of the various views as to the na-
ture of property and ownership." Keesling, Property Taxation of Leases and Other
Limited Interests, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 470, 486 (1959). But see Andrews v. Cusin, 65
Wn. 2d 205, 207, 396 P.2d 155, 156 (1964) where the court stated: "The concept of
leasehold estates as personal property, rather than real property, is generally accepted
by the courts." See also In re Barclay's Estate, 1 Wn. 2d 82, 95 P.2d 393 (1939).
where without addressing the constitutionality of the statute, the court held that lease-
hold interests are "immovable tangible personal property." But see Forster Ship-
building Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d 736, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1960) (Legislature's classification of a leasehold interest as personal property un-
constitutional).
Since "all real estate" constitutes one class of property, see WASH. CONST. art. VII.
§ I (amendment 14), if leases of real property are held to be real property, rather than
personal property, any property tax must apply uniformly to all leasehold interests as
well as to other taxable property.
85. WASH. CONST. art XI, § 12 states:
The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns
or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof.
for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws,
vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes
for such purposes.
86. See State ex rel. Latimer v. Henry, 28 Wash. 38, 68 P. 368 (1902).
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state has acted the matter is one of statewide concern, there are few
decisions striking down state legislation on this constitutional basis.
Thus, it will be difficult to strike down the in lieu tax by asserting a
constitutional challenge on the basis of the constitutional prohibition.87
D. Validity as an Excise Tax
Assuming that the in lieu tax in chapter 187 successfully survives
these constitutional challenges, its validity as an excise tax must be
considered. An excise tax is not subject to the constitutional uni-
formity requirement.8 8 Furthermore, the Legislature is generally
granted great leeway in making classifications with regard to excise
taxes;89 the state need show only that the general requirements of rea-
sonableness imposed by the state and federal constitutions have been
met.90 A heavy burden rests on the challenger to prove the classifica-
tion arbitrary and unreasonable, imposing burdens on one class to
exclusion of another.91 Imposition of the in lieu tax of chapter 187
appears to make a reasonable distinction between leases which meet
certain requirements for time of negotiation and amount of rental and
those leases which do not meet the requirements.9 2 Thus, if found to
be an excise tax, the in lieu tax appears on rather firm ground.93
87. The Washington Supreme Court in Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147,
50 P.2d 36 (1935), held that education is primarily and essentially a state purpose,
and a tax imposed by the state to support education was a tax for a state purpose,
even though the monies were distributed directly to the local districts. See also Moses
Lake School Dist. v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wn. 2d 551, 503 P.2d 86
(1972) (statute transferring property from school district to community college dis-
trict without compensation of statewide concern and, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision); WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2; art. III, § 22.
See also J. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF
METROPOLITA AREA PROBLEMS 20-22 (1961). For a general discussion of WASH.
CONST. art. XI, § 12, see Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations
in Washington, 38 WASH. L. REV. 743, 749-55 (1963).
88. See note 80 supra.
89. State ex rel. Namer Inv. Corp. v. Williams, 73 Wn. 2d 1, 435 P.2d 975 (1968).
90. Id. at 5-6, 435 P.2d at 978-79.
91. O'Connell v. Conte, 76 Wn. 2d 280, 283-84, 456 P.2d 317, 319-20 (1969).
Such a challenge is generally based on the privileges and immunities clause of the
state constitution, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12, which has been interpreted to be equiva-
lent to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Texas Co.. v. Cohn, 8 Wn. 2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941); Hansen v.
Hutt, 83 Wn. 2d 195, 200, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973).
92. See text accompanying notes 18-20 and 83 supra.
93. See Note, 35 WASH. L. REV. 121, 137-40 (1960) for analysis of the business
and occupation tax in Washington, an analysis which .applies generally to excise taxes
in the state.
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However, some question may arise concerning the reasonableness
of one aspect of the classification used to impose the in lieu tax. Pre-
sumably, the excise is upon the privilege of the public lessor to receive
rental income for the leasing of publicly owned land, 94 but not all les-
sors exercising that privilege are treated equally. It may be reasonable
to impose an excise on some lessors receiving at least ninety percent of
economic rent while not taxing others receiving less than ninety per-
cent. It seems unreasonable, however, not to tax lessor A, who re-
ceives ninety percent of economic rent, simply because the lease has
been renegotiated since July 1, 1970, while taxing lessor B under
identical circumstances except that his lease has not been renegotiated
(or "renegotiated" only to the extent that the amount of consideration
was changed and the term of the lease was shortened). 95 Lessor A ar-
guably is exercising the same privilege to the same extent as is lessor
B, and discrimination between the two for purposes of the excise tax is
prima facie unreasonable.
E. Severability Clause
The Legislature apparently intended to deter any of these constitu-
tional challenges to the in lieu tax, however. The severability clause of
section 13 provides that if the fourteen percent in lieu tax is held in-
valid, the entirety of the Act, except for sections 3 and 14,96 shall be
null and void.
Section 14 provides: "If the provisions of this 1973 amendatory act
relative to leasehold in lieu taxes are held invalid, the following prop-
erty shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation . . . ." The section
proceeds to list, with some variations, all leaseholds otherwise exempt
from ad valorem taxation under chapter 187. 97 As a result, a public
94. The constitutional exemption from taxation of public property does not extend
to excise taxes on business type activities. Tacoma v. State Tax Comm'n, 177 Wash.
604, 616-17.33 P.2d 899, 903 (1934).
95. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
96. The Act, as printed, incorrectly refers to § 15, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.460
(Supp. 1973), rather than § 14, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.455 (Supp. 1973). This
mistake is the result of not changing internal references after a section of the Bill was
deleted by the Senate and remaining sections were renumbered. Section 12 of the Act
(which provides that §§ 2-10 and § 16 of the Act are added to WASH. REV. CODE tit.
82), by referring to § 16 evidences this renumbering mistake. There are only 15
sections to the Act.
97. Compare §§ 14, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.455 (Supp. 1973), and 11, WASH.
REV. CODE § 84.36.450 (Supp. 1973) of the Act. Section 14 exempts a lease of state
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body which challenges the constitutionality of the in lieu tax must as-
sess the consequences of a victory: Ad valorem property tax exemp-
tions will still be granted to a number of leasehold interests, specifi-
cally those contracted prior to July 1, 1970, not since renegotiated,
and which require the lessee to pay at least ninety percent of eco-
nomic rent, but no compensating in lieu tax will be assessed the lessors
and distributed to taxing districts.9 8 The resulting fiscal impact on
taxing districts could be significant. This legislative strategy, to the
extent it is in fact strategy, may backfire, however, because some
public lessors may feel they would be better off to challenge the va-
lidity of the in lieu tax and, if successful, live with the straight prop-
erty tax exemptions when they weigh the burden of the in lieu tax
imposed upon them against the ad valorem property tax revenues
foregone from leaseholds which were generating very little tax revenue
anyway prior to Pier 67.9
Although it will do little to deter lessees, the severability clause may
deter county assessors from asserting the unconstitutionality of the in
lieu tax since many of the administrative difficulties they experience
under chapter 187 would remain even if the tax were invalidated. To
determine if a lease is exempt under section 14, it must still be deter-
mined whether the lease has been renegotiated or whether the lessee is
owned property if the lease was entered into prior to July 1, 1970, has not been re-
negotiated, requires payment of at least 90% of economic rent and authorizes the
lessor to make in lieu payments to political subdivisions other than that of the lessor.
Also exempt are those leasehold estates referred to in note 23 supra. However, no
statement is made to exclude leasehold estates in operating properties vested in public
utility companies assessed and taxed pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE ch. 84.12 as ap-
pears in § 11.
The reason the Legislature provided for the ad valorem property tax exemption
and an excise tax may partially involve the court's decision in Carkonen v. Williams,
76 Wn. 2d 617, 458 P.2d 480 (1969), which held the 50% valuation rule in the state
constitution mandatory and denied that the state had the power to alter this require-
ment. On the other hand, the power of the Legislature to grant exemptions is of little
doubt. See WASH. CONST. art. VII, § I (amendment 14). This power was coupled
with the more constitutionally doubtful in lieu tax on the public lessors. Thus, one
may be better able to understand the reason for the severability clause; i.e., the Legis-
lature had some doubts regarding the validity of the in lieu tax.
98. It should be noted that this exemption is not identical to that generally
granted under the in lieu tax provisions of ch. 187. See note 97 supra.
99. See notes 51-52, 56-59 and accompanying text supra and text accompanying
note 14 supra. It is suggested that a more likely, and perhaps wiser, course of action
is for the challenger to pursue a more equitable law through the legislative process.
Ch. 187 represents a worthwhile attempt to improve the assessment process relative to
leasehold interests. Recent hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means
indicate that the Legislature is willing to continue studying this area and make im-
provements in the tax structure, rather than to grant additional tax exemptions.
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paying at least ninety percent of economic rent as defined by section 3
of the Act. 100
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE TO CHAPTER 187
The constitutional tax exemption for public lands is intended to
benefit the public, not a small number of private lessees of that land.
When an interest in land, whether freehold or for years, is severed
from the public domain and put into private hands, it should be-and
ordinarily is-subject to taxation. 101 The interest of the public lessor,
however, should be carefully excluded from assessment by the ap-
praisal process and the tax levy should be restricted to the private les-
see's interest in the public property. 102 The court's decision in Pier 67
would have achieved this result and would have had "the desirable
long-term effect of standarizing state lease agreements and assessment
standards" for leases of public and private land so that neither re-
ceived an economic bonus at the expense of property tax revenues.10 3
A uniform return to the edict of Pier 67, which recognized the
complexity of the assessment process, would provide greater stability,
uniformity and equity in the valuation and taxation of leasehold inter-
ests.' 04 The Legislature should repeal chapter 187 and adopt the
100. This statement applies to only one group of the leases exempted from ad
valorem property taxation under § 14, WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.455 (Supp. 1973).
This is the group to which the bulk of the discussion in this note is directed. Sub-
sections (2) through (9) of § 14 provide exemptions without regard to economic rent
paid, renegotiation or date the lease was contracted. See note 23 supra.
101. Trimble v. City of Seattle, 231 U.S. 683, 689 (1914); Moeller v. Gormley.
44 Wash. 465, 468-69, 87 P. 507, 508 (1906). See also Keesling, Property Taxation
of Leases and Other Limited Interests, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 470, 475-79 (1959). It is
generally conceded that leasehold interests are taxable to the same extent as any other
privately owned property. See Pier 67, 78 Wn. 2d 48, 469 P.2d 902 (1970). Lease-
holds carved out from privately owned fees are not taxed separately since Washington
follows the unit assessment rule and assesses the paramount interest in land alone.
See Alaska Land Co. v. King County, 77 Wn. 2d 248, 461 P.2d 339 (1969): Clark-
Kunzl, Inc. v. Williams, 78 Wn. 2d 59, 469 P.2d 874 (1970).
102. 0. BROTHERS, APPRAISAL OF POSSESSORY INTERESTS 4 (California State
Board of Equalization Publication, Feb. 1955).
103. Note, 46 WASH. L. REV. 795, 803 (1971).
104. "Clearly, the standards of valuation for assessing leaseholds are the same
standards for valuing and assessing taxable property in general." Pier 67, 78 Wn. 2d
at 52, 469 P.2d at 905 (citation omitted). The court in Pier 67 also stated:
The ultimate responsibility of the assessor is to determine the true cash value of
the property. No "rule of thumb" can be formulated to fit every situation; but
the assessor must consider all relevant circumstances pertinent and helpful in
making his assessment within the ambit of the applicable statutes.
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court's conclusion in Pier 67 that special assessment standards for
leasehold interests are inappropriate (and also unnecessary). Taxing
leasehold interests on the right to use the property over the term of the
leasehold would utilize established assessment procedures and exper-
tise while avoiding the need for the assessor to make highly question-
able decisions to determine not only the value of the property to be
taxed but also the party to pay the tax as required by the in lieu tax in
chapter 187. The Legislature should not attempt to tax public, tax
exempt entities to compensate for property tax exemptions given a
small group of private lessees of that land. 105
Lessees have had over three years in which to renegotiate their
leases and adjust for the impact of Pier 67. The moratorium enacted
by the Legislature in 1971, designed to forestall the harsh effect of Pier
67, was an equitable, necessary measure. Whether the parties have
struck a good or bad bargain, however, should no longer be of con-
cern to the assessor or the tax collector and should not serve as the
basis of taxation or the lack thereof.10 6 Lessees who did not renego-
tiate during the moratorium should not be rewarded for having failed
to do so. The time for moratorium-whether in the form of a Morato-
rium Act or an in lieu tax on public lessors-has passed.
Scott Dunham
Id. at 58, 469 P.2d at 909.
For a discussion of the different methods of valuing leasehold interests, see Com-
ment, The Valuation of Leaseholds for Ad Valorem Property Tax Purposes-The
Reasonable Assessor Standard, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 136 (1968).
105. Ch."187 serves to erode the property tax base at a time when it should be
strengthened and broadened. See 1 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX, 77-78
(1963):
The seemingly endless process of narrowing the property tax base has progressed
so far, and in such diverse directions, as to necessitate some forthright determina-
tion not only of where it should stop but how much of it should be repealed.
Step by step, exemptions place heavier burdens on those still required to pay, or
reduce the responsibility of local governments by inducing them to depend in-
creasingly on fiscal aid.
In the State of Washington, it was estimated in a 1971 report that the fair market
value of tax exempt property, both real and personal, amounted to $34.1 billion
while that of taxable property amounted to only $36 billion. Thus, nearly one-half
of the state's tax base may be already exempted from ad valorem taxation with in-
tangibles constituting 60.7% of all exempt properties. WASHINGTON STATE DEPART-
MENT OF REVENUE, TAX EXEMPTIONS 20-23 (1971).
106. As indicated by the "renegotiation" of the Olympic Hotel lease, see text
accompanying note 41 supra, contract negotiations are well suited to ameliorate any
inequities resulting from taxation, without further assistance by the Legislature.
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